There are two types of agreements: Those which are mutual contracts and those which are concessions of facts. The second type is a procedural convenience to relieve a party of having to prove a fact. Here, the husband conceded a fact, his earning capacity. This was not a stipulation because both parties did not agree to it.
Wife is estopped from seeking extension of maintenance where stipulation stated that there “would be no extensions.” The estoppel doctrine applies even though there was not a “comprehensive settlement of all …issues” Estoppel applies where the parties have resolved all other issues concerning the divorce before agreeing to the stipulation for which estoppel is sought.
Wife is estopped from seeking extension of maintenance where stipulation stated that there “would be no extensions.” The estoppel doctrine applies even though there was not a “comprehensive settlement of all …issues” Estoppel applies where the parties have resolved all other issues concerning the divorce before agreeing to the stipulation for which estoppel is sought.
A settlement agreement which allows for maintenance to be modified only for increases violated public policy, so equitable estoppel does not apply. Wife would only get increases without sharing in the risk and, unlike a stipulation which has a nonmodifiable fixed amount or term, this one-sided agreement invites litigation.
Marital stipulation was unambiguous that wife agreed to assume a proportionate share of gains and losses from husband retirement. Judicial economy would be ill-served by permitting a judicial reallocation of loss.
Trial court has authority to construe an ambiguous judgment to effectuate the trial court’s intent. Here, the judgment is not clear on the meaning of “gross income”. Therefore the trial court had the authority to clarify what it intended and its construction was reasonable in light of the entire record.
There is no right to withdraw from a stipulation after court approval. Court approval does not require a written judgment – court’s expression of its decision to adopt the stipulation is sufficient.
Trial court erred in finding that child stipulation was percentage-based: The language “The monthly amount of $400 (17% of current income of $28,000/year”) is unambiguously a dollar expressed order and that the dollar amount is based on husband’s wages.
Stipulation making future child support unmodifiable in the event of a change in placement is against public policy and void. However, stipulation forgiving arrearages is not contrary to public policy.
Stipulation freezing child support was unenforceable because it was not in the best interests of the children and therefore contrary to public policy.